The cars : Ledbury Maestro – Rodacar’s Bulgarian Austin

There was an operation to build Austin Maestros in Bulgaria, and we have the full and exclusive story of how it came together. Meet the Rodacar Maestro – which we later knew and loved as the Ledbury Maestro.

Thanks to an ex-Rover Group executive, we have been able to piece together the story of the Roadacar assembly operation in Bulgaria and conclude why it failed in the way it did with just 2200 examples built.


Rodacar Maestro: Full of Eastern promise…

After years of consistent retreat, the Rover Group found itself in comparatively safe hands during the mid-1990s. Years of tight, efficient management and careful financial control under the stewardship of British Aerospace (BAe) had instilled a climate of careful spending.

While production of the Austin Maestro and Montego was being wound down at the Cowley factory in Oxford, plans were afoot to set up an assembly operation overseas. Various options were discussed but, in the end, a deal – which had initially been led by the Bulgarian Government – was concluded to set-up a KD (Knock Down) assembly operation in the city of Varna on the Black Sea coast. This went hand-in-hand with plans to build the Montego to be assembled from kits in India by Sipani Automobiles.

Varna was seen as being ideal for the transport by sea for parts from the UK until locally sourced parts could be developed and proven. The programme to create the new factory was known in the UK as Project Enterprise and, as former worker, Robbie Barnes recalls, these were interesting times.

Maestro’s move to Bulgaria: Project Enterprise is born

‘I was a member of Project Enterprise,’ he says. ‘It consisted of eight Cowley guys and a couple of BAe Engineers. We went to Varna in January 1994 and were immediately faced with a derelict site that adjoined the Vamo factory. Our remit was to provide a car assembly facility for the production of Maestro cars from KD kits.’

A potential site for the factory had also been identified next to a factory that had, prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, manufactured forklift-trucks for the whole of the Eastern Bloc. Some local labour expertise therefore also existed. The plant was expected to produce 10,000 cars annually and investment in the plan was estimated at $20m – the biggest foreign investment in Bulgaria thus far since the end of the Cold War.

Robbie recalls, ‘we were under incredible budget constraints – imposed by UK-based management who never actually set foot in Bulgaria. There was an ongoing process of assessing UK-based underused or redundant plant and machinery that could be suited to low level, but good quality assembly.

‘We also had to undertake a severe learning curve in how to deal with Bulgarian contractors. Then we had to build trust with other well-connected locals, and maintain a single focus on the task in hand when many Rover officers tried to interfere in matters considerably outside their knowledge range.’

Building the new factory in 1994

A new factory in Varna, Bulgaria was built especially to house the production line.
A new factory in Varna, Bulgaria was built especially to house the production line

The factory building was started in late 1994, and volume production commenced in June 1995. The Rodacar AD company was 51% Rover Group and 49% Daru Group owned. Daru was a Bulgarian company that owned a bank and also were the main agents for BMW in Bulgaria. Rover Group provided the manufacturing expertise and Daru Group provided the sales expertise/outlets for the Maestro.

Varna was opened by the Bulgarian President, Zhelyu Zhelev, on 8 September 1995, exactly on schedule. The British Ambassador to Bulgaria (Roger Short) and various senior Rover Group board members also attended. By this time the factory was producing quality vehicles successfully to projected volume, cost and quality targets – and, most importantly, the total project came in on time and within planned budgets.

The production line was staffed mainly by Bulgarian engineering graduates, who were all very keen to learn about car production. Another manager close to the project says: ‘The co-operation between the in-country team from Rover Group (ex-pats) and the support from Cowley Manufacturing Engineering was absolutely first class.’

‘First class’ quality production

Bulgarian President, Zhelyu Zhelev (centre) opened the plant in September 1995.
Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev (centre) opened the plant in September 1995

That would probably explain why the Varna-produced Maestro was ‘at least’ equal in quality index to the last examples built in Cowley – a fact confirmed by a Rover internal quality audit. (Ex-pats would probably say it was better). Robbie confirms this: ‘The crucial objective that we had in January 1994 never left us. Our task was to build an assembly facility that would not only meet the Maestro in Bulgaria requirements, but meet quality levels demanded by Rover.’

Another manager explains why. The factory was fully-equipped and state of the art. ‘It had a Paint facility, Trim and Final Finish, Rolling road, PDI – and was a total entity of factory and its workers, it all came together excellently.’

However, the car failed. A combination of weaknesses in the sales and marketing strategy, uncompetitive pricing for various reasons and the arrival of a serious rival in the form of the Skoda Felicia proved to be the death-knell for the Maestro. The new Skoda particularly hit hard – it was more modern, priced slightly lower and also had better aftermarket support.

Liberalised market: a killer for the Maestro

Robbie says that external forces were partially responsible for this, and not just Maestro product weaknesses. ‘Our final visit was in November 1995 when we formally signed off the facility to the Rodacar team. While in Varna on that visit, one of the key members of Rodacar was tragically killed in a road accident in Serbia. That person was the vital, and only link, that had existed with the Bulgarian Government. The knowledge, and years of political nurturing, went in an instant.’

As for the competition, Skoda, by then VAG-owned, imported the Felicia from Czechoslovakia to Bulgaria at 50% of normal import duty, whereas the Bulgarian Government refused to action a previous commitment to reduce the import duties on Maestro parts imported from the UK, while local sourcing was established.

Our other contact added: ‘There was also the non-commitment by the Bulgarian Government to honour substantial, previously promised, departmental orders for thousands of the vehicles – a measure that would have raised the profile of the Maestro in Bulgaria.’

A lack of market understanding from Rover

Robbie agrees. ‘There was that, and a mixture of not really understanding the local market and being somewhat complacent when competitors knocked on the Bulgarian door. These were all factors that contributed to he project’s rapid demise.’

Opinion is that the major causes of closure were the previously-mentioned concession to Czechoslovakia/VAG for importing the Skoda, the reneging of the Government to temporarily ease import duty on Maestro parts from the UK and the refusal to confirm major government orders.

Production ceased on 4 April 1996, after 2200 cars had been built – when the factory was mothballed, 250 assembly workers lost their jobs. Several years later, the unfinished cars and some of the production facility were returned to the UK, where it was subsequently sold off to Parkway Services in Ledbury. The sad thing is that Varna could have been a useful addition to the Group’s armoury despite the failure of the Maestro: ‘I could never understand why Land Rover never picked it up as a KD plant for Eastern Europe. I know it was proposed by a few people.’

Conflicting reports from Bulgaria

In the UK, many people within the company held the opinion that the Bulgarian operation failed because it was poorly managed. One insider told us: ‘It’s interesting, but also rather puzzling to hear such positive reports about Varna. The word coming back to Canley was that it was near impossible to work with the Bulgarians.

‘They didn’t turn up for meetings and, if they did, they never did the things they’d committed to. They had no concept of business as we know it. I was told that production never really got off the ground. The photographs I was sent of the factory didn’t look remotely world-class, but rather derelict and run-down…’

The truth would appear to be somewhat different from that widely held opinion – the factory cannot have been derelict, as it was purpose-built for the job, and the local engineers and workforce were all keen according to our executive who was intimately involved with the project.

Whatever the case, the end of the Maestro’s production in Bulgaria was a tragedy for the local economy: ‘It was devastating for Varna, and also for Rover Group, to close what was a first-class manufacturing facility with a well-trained, motivated work-force which had produced to planned performance levels. It had also been the Rover Group’s first overseas venture for many years.’

Robbie says that the team which oversaw Varna are all still in touch with each other. He says, ‘Back in 2014, the last time we ran a newsletter for the team, the Vamo site had been bulldozed and replaced by a shopping centre. The Rodacar site is now a Bulgarian version of B&Q.’

The north western corner wing of the Varna factory in 1995 - several finished Maestros can be seen parked inside the compound.
The north western corner wing of the Varna factory in 1995 – several finished Maestros can be seen parked inside the compound

Living a second life in the UK

Parkway Services based in Ledbury ended up buying the kits that weren’t shipped to Bulgaria in May 1997. According to the Maestro and Montego Owners Club, 621 left-hand-drive Maestro 1.3 cars and vans were purchased and subsequently converted to right-hand drive using factory parts.

All were in Bulgarian-spec, which were effectively Clubmans without sunroofs. The conversion process included a new dashboard, right-hand drive wipers and steering rack and column. Although Ledbury Maestros were all registered as kit cars, they were often reviewed as new cars (see video above) and, thanks to a list price of £4995, they were considered to be the cheapest new cars on sale in Britain between 1998 and 2001.

There were some left-hand drive cars sold by Parkway – some were bought by people who wanted to drive them in Europe, others because conversion prices had dried up from Rover. According to the Maestro and Montego Owners Club, Ledbury-built Maestros all had non-Rover VIN numbers.

There were also a number of ex-Bulgarian cars sold in the UK by Apple 2000 Limited of Culford, Bury St Edmunds. These were sold between 1998 and 2000, were similarly specified to the Ledbury Maestro, and can be told apart by their left-hand drive wipers and mirrors. However, because they were fully-built cars that were imported back to the UK, Apple Maestros have Rover VINs.

Both Ledbury and Apple Maestros are now a major historical curiosity, and well worth seeking out.


With thanks to an ex-Rover executive and Andrew Rozeik for their help in compiling this feature.

Keith Adams

19 Comments

  1. A fascinating insight. I was at the SVAB site in Bugaria and came across the name “Maestro”. I did a websearch and your fine sight came up with this.
    According to SVAB, in 1995 226 Maestros were sold and in 1996 265. Typical of so many British efforts overseas, nice try but execution, or perhaps due dilligence, wanting. From what is stated above, it seems Bulgaria was the worst choice that could have been made.
    Another excellent article about the UK car industry.

  2. Good article but misses the point somewhat. The product and price were wrong for the market and by definition the initial business plan was wrong. Additionally, there was no route to market i.e. no dealer network and Rover refused to allow RodaCar (Maestro) share it’s dealer network.
    So you had an old product sold at UK cost price plus profit in a market where similarly aged product was upto 40% cheaper and no dealer network to buy or service the car.

  3. I lived in Bulgaria back then, and I remember initially there was a great optimism about the whole thing. The car failled on the marked miserably, like above stated – it was very outdated, and very expensive compared to the Felicia, and the used Golf 2’s and Opel Kadett’s coming from abroad.

    Combine that with corrupted government, which probably got their hands greased by someone not to help out Rodacar, with total disregard of the local employment and economy. The locals also used to buy a lot of new Lada cars ( Samara and Riva/2105/2107)and Aleko ( Moskvich) 2141 in the early 90’s, which wereboth priced much lower than the Maestro.
    If the Maestro was priced right, it would have been a success.

  4. This whole sad tale reeks of ‘browm envelopes full of cash’. Another sorry tale in the history of the Maestro

  5. What timing, I have been clearing my shed this afternoon and found one of the tiny Maestro’s that came off the model of the factory that we had in an engineering building at Cowley, before it went in a skip. Little green one about 20mm long! I worked with the team in Cowley preparing some of our old kit ready for Bulgaria, engine jigs and “stuff up” tables etc. A team went out there to set everything up, in Cowley a new facility was put in to transfer bodies onto lorries for transport there.
    Almost all of us expected it to end in tears, we only had to listen to the stories from those who had been out there. It was a good facility but as mentioned Skoda had a better market. I still work at the plant, MINI of course now, I do miss those make do and mend days.

  6. I was a member of Project Enterprise – that consisted of 8 Cowley guys and a couple of BAe engineers. We went to Varna in January 1994 and were immediately faced with a derelict site that adjoined the Vamo factory.

    Our remit was to provide a car assembly facility for the production of Maestro cars from KD kits. The facility we provided was entirely fit for purpose and was operational in September 1995.

    That said, it was not without difficulties! We were under incredible budget constraints – imposed by UK based management who never actually set foot in Bulgaria; an ongoing process of assessing UK based underused or redundant plant and machinery that could be suited to low level, but good quality assembly; undertake a severe learning curve in how to deal with Bulgarian contractors; build trust with other well connected locals; and maintain a single focus on the task in hand when many Rover officers tried to interfere in matters considerably outside their knowledge range.

    The crucial objective that we had in January, 1994 never left us. Our task was to build – virtually from nothing – an assembly facility that would not only meet the Maestro in Bulgaria requirements ( soon to be Rodacar) but meeting Quality levels demanded by Rover.

    Our final visit was in November 1995 when we formally signed off the facility to the Rodacar team. Whilst in Varna on that visit one of the key members of Rodacar was tragically killed in a road accident in Bosnia. That person was the vital, and only link, that had existed with the Bulgarian Government. The knowledge, and years of political nurturing, went in an instance. That, and a mixture of not really understanding the local market and being somewhat complacent when competitors knocked on the Bulgarian door all contributed to a rapid demise.

    I have several photos of our first day in Varna and the dereliction that we encountered but, as the months progressed our images of its transformation are quite remarkable. We are proud with what we delivered and handed over. It was incredibly sad for many reasons that those that followed could not deliver the objectives to assemble and sell cars.

  7. I remember discussing with a Bulgarian colleague around 2002 about this, and he confirmed that the car was too expensive for the local market.
    Also, i would not be surprised if i learned that VAG was responsible for the Bulgarian government not keeping the promises for lower import tax on the KD cars.
    This is business as usual for the german industry.

    • Surely though by 94-95, Rover was under the wing of the Bavarians, could they not have exerted similar pressure?
      It may have been a good new facility even for their models, the outgoing 5 series was still respected (and the untrue rumours that it was the 75 base), or a cheap pre-1 series 3 series compact for Eastern Europe?

      • What i understand from the main article, is that Rover themselves (never mind BMW) weren’t really bothered about this plant, they looked at it as a potentialy profitable way to offload the Maestro tooling, rather than a long term investment. As it turned out, the financial part of the move wasn’t really well thought. Another link in this long chain of short sighted decisions.

        • A shame this facility did not survive as it might have enabled MG Rover Group to have considered overseas assembly of the Rover 45 there rather than looking at the former Daewoo factory in Poland.

    • This bit stands out to me :

      “one of the key members of RODACAR was tragically killed in a road accident in Serbia. That person was the vital, and only link, that had existed with the Bulgarian Government”

      Key government link man dies in freak road accident….sounds a bit Jason Bourne

  8. Really?
    Wasn’t life behind the Iron Curtain not grim Enough, already?
    And they wanted Maestros as well 🙂

    Was Kenny Everett involved in this?
    It’s all in the best possible taste.

    • Only a few years earlier they were lucky to get Trabants, Ladas, Skodas, FSOs etc.

      This might have worked in a Communist closed market economy, but not when Bulgarias was going away from this.

  9. The GDP per capita of Bulgaria is about $6000 in 2006, how can you expect to sell cars to a population which can barely afford to have food on the table?

  10. With developing countries, the wealth doesn’t grown evenly, so that a large number of people stay poor while the better off want to drive something better than a Maestro…

    Otherwise, it would be a perfect communist era type car

  11. What a crazy idea. It’s self evident that as soon as the wall comes down every entrepreneur worth his salt will be hitchhiking to Germany and buying a second hand Golf for pennies, then taking it back home for a very profitable week’s work. In the medium term all the majors will be setting up modern factories there building their current products with local content. Maybe if they’d shipped the entire Maestro line out to Bulgaria, and then reverse imported it throughout Europe as a bargain basement car under the old Austin badge that could have worked for a few years.
    ie Set up your own in house Skoda. It would have to be cheap though which means a high degree of localization, plus an effective facelift like the Felicia.

  12. So India’s Saipa got the Montego and Bulgarias Rodacar got the Maestro, both were a big failure for essentially the same reason

  13. As a Bulgarian who was about 30 in 1995, the last car I would buy at that time, was Rover Maestro! In 95’s we bought BMW, Mercedes, Audi, etc. …old but gold …for better price 😉

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